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ABSTRACT [1]
NASA Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) is currently
at work developing hardware and systems for the Ares I
rocket that will send future astronauts into orbit. Built on
cutting-edge launch technologies, evolved powerful
Apollo and Space Shuttle propulsion elements, and
decades of NASA spaceflight experience, Ares I is the
essential core of a safe, reliable, cost-effective space
transportation system -- one that will carry crewed
missions back to the moon, on to Mars and out into the
solar system.
Ares I is an in-line, two-stage rocket configuration
topped by the Orion crew vehicle and its launch abort
system. In addition to the vehicle's primary mission --
carrying crews of four to six astronauts to Earth orbit --
Ares I may also use its 25-ton payload capacity to deliver
resources and supplies to the International Space Station,
or to "park" payloads in orbit for retrieval by other
spacecraft bound for the moon or other destinations.
Crew transportation to the International Space Station is
... planned to begin no later than 2014. The first lunar
excursion is scheduled for the 2020 tirneframe.
This paper presents the challenges in designing the Ares I
upper stage for reliability and safety while minimizing
weight and maximizing performance. 1.1
Figure 1.1 Concept Launch ofAres I
First Stage
1. INTRODUCTION [1]
NASA is currently designing, testing, and evaluating
hardware for the Ares I Crew Launch Vehicle (CLV)
(Fig. 1.1), the next generation vehicle that will carry
humans into Earth's orbit and beyond. Ares I is an in-
line, two-stage rocket configuration topped by the Orion
crew exploration vehicle, its service module and a launch
abort system. The Ares I CLV is separated into several
element teams led by NASA Marshall Space Flight
Center in Huntsville, Alabama. These element teams are
the First Stage (FS), the Upper Stage Engine (USE), and
the Upper Stage (US). This section presents an overview
of these CLV elements.
The FS Element is a single, five-segment reusable solid
rocket booster derived from the Space Shuttle Program.
It has a Reusable Solid Rocket Motor (RSRM) that burns
a solid propellant called PolyButadiene AcryloNitrile
(pBAN). A newly designed forward adapter will mate
the FS to the US, and the US interstage wiJI be equipped
with booster separation motors to disconnect the stages
during ascent. During the first 2.5 minutes of flight, the
fIrst stage booster powers the vehicle to an altitude of
about 200,000 feet and a speed ofMach 6.1.
ATK Thiokol of Brigham City, Utah, is the prime
contractor for the first stage.
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20070031695 2019-08-30T01:37:35+00:00Z
1.2 Upper Stage Engine entire CLV launch stack, as well as the separation
systems required to perform first stage separation [2].
The Upper Stage Engine, the J-2X (Fig. 1.2), is an
evolved variation of the J-2 engine that propelled the
Saturn lB/Saturn V, and the J-2S (the J-2S was a
simplified version of the J-2 developed and tested in the
early 1970s but never flown). After the FS separates, the
J-2X engine ignites and powers the Orion to an altitude
of about 63 miles.
Pratt & Whitney Rocketdyne in Canoga Park, Calif., is
the prime contractor for the CLV upper stage engine.
The Upper Stage of the Ares I Crew Launch Vehicle is
primarily an in-house NASA design being led at
Marshall Space Flight Center in Huntsville, Alabama.
The following section presents a synopsis of the Risk
Assessment process within the Upper Stage element.
2. UPPER STAGE RISK ASSESSMENT
PROCESS
~
-. ,- r-.-,
- ~~.'~ ..
, ..
"" . '"" '
, --aJ" ~
. ,-..
" ,::::.. >'
~ ..
2.1 Organization
The Upper Stage Element organization (Fig. 2.1) is led
by an Upper Stage Office and each substructure under the
US Office is an Integrated Product Team (IPT). The
Upper Stage Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA)
organization operates adjunctively to the Upper Stage
Office and is responsible for safety, reliability, quality,
software assurance, and other mission assurance
functions.
Concept Image of the J-2X engine.
(NASAlMSFC)
Figure 1.2 Concept Image ofthe J-2X
1.3 Upper Stage
The function of the Upper Stage is to complete the
,., second portion of the ascent phase after the First Stage
separates from the vehicle.
The CLV Upper Stage (US) is the portion of the CLV
extending from the first stage forward frustum to the
Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV) adapter. The Upper
Stage consists of three major structural sections: the
Instrument Unit, the Core Stage, and the Interstage. The
Main Propulsion System provides LOXILH2 fuel tanks,
pressure system, and feedlines to the Upper Stage J2-X
engine. The Roll Control System (RoCS) performs roll
stabilization control of the vehicle prior to FS separation,
and the Upper Stage Reaction Control System (RCS)
provides attitude control to the vehicle during Upper
Stage flight. The Upper Stage also provides Thrust
Vector Control (TVC) to the Upper Stage Engine. The
Upper Stage also provides control electronics for the
Figure 2. JUpper Stage Organization
The adjunctivity of the US S&MA organization and the
nature of the IPT process requires reliability, safety, and
quality engineers to be represented in each IPT. The IPT
process then ensures that safety, reliability, and quality
are designed into the system.
2.2 Integrated Reliability,
Maintainability, and Supportability
(RMS) Analysis Process
The RMS Analysis Process consists of three sub-
processes, the Reliability Analysis Process, the
Maintainability Analysis Process, and the Supportability
Analysis Process (Fig. 2.2).
failures across subsystems. Sensitivity studies,
uncertainty analysis, and scenario modeling will also be
conducted within the integrated model and also at the
lower level system models.
The reliability analysis within each IPT is of primary
importance not only to the development of the models,
but also for the feedback the analysis provides to the
system designers. This feedback facilitates the process
of influencing the design to make the system safer and
more reliable. Thus, it can be said that the real goal of
the reliability analysis is to improve design by identifying
high probability failure modes and accident sequences,
and mitigating those risks through system redesign.
2.2.1
Figure 2.2 Integrated RMS Process
The Reliability Analysis Process
2.2.1.1 Development of Reliability Models
within the IPT
The Reliability Analysis (RA) Process starts with inputs
from the Failure Modes and Effects Analyses (FMEA),
Hazard Analyses (HA), and Human Factors/Software
Reliability Analyses when available. This information,
along with the information obtained during system
familiarization within the IPT Process (i.e. system
schematics) prompts the IPT reliability analyst to begin a
baseline logic model of the system. In parallel with the
logic model development, the reliability analyst collects
available data and begins to quantify the reliability logic
model. The model is further refined within the IPT
process, and ultimately generates estimates for Loss of
Mission (LaM) and Loss of Crew (LaC). A flow
diagram of the Reliability Analysis process is shown in
Fig. 2.3.
A flowchart representing the Reliability Analysis process
within each IPT is shown in Fig. 2.4. The process begins
with system familiarization and review of the current
FMEAs, HAs, system schematics, available data, etc.
Groundrules and assumptions of the modeling and the
interpretation of system failures are then constructed and
a preliminary model is developed. The system logic
model, goundrules and assumptions, and data are then
reviewed with the design engineers. The model is
subsequently updated and reiterated until the model has
IPT concurrence. To demonstrate concurrence, the IPT
lead will sign a statement formally declaring that the
Reliability Analysis model has been concurred with
within the IPT.
Figure 2.3 Reliability Analysis Process
Figure 2.4 Reliability Analysis process within the IPT
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Once the process of developing the logic models has
begun within the IPT framework, the subsystem models
are simultaneously integrated into a complete Upper
Stage model. The integrated model is then analyzed for
It should also be mentioned that, parallel to the
development of the reliability logic model, reliability
analyses are performed during trade and fault tolerance
studies specific to that IPT. Depending upon the
outcome of these studies, the subsequent analyses are
potentially used as part of the system model.
2.2.2 _Tbe Maintainability Analysis
Process VI PftA(Top Down Analysis)
The inputs to the Maintainability Process consist of
outputs from the Reliability Analysis Process (i.e. Mean
Time To Failure (MTTF)), and information garnered
from the Supportability Analysis Process regarding
scheduled and unscheduled maintenance events. The
process performs maintenance analysis to define the
maintenance activity flow. Outputs of this task include
Mean Time To Repair (MTTR), maintenance task
definition, maintainability assessments, and maintenance
characteristics.
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The combination of the outputs of all three processes
within the RMS Analysis will subsequently generate
system Availability estimates.
3. INTEGRATED CREW LAUNCH
VEmCLE PROBABILISTIC RISK
ASSESSMENT (PRA)
Supportability analysis is performed by the Logistics
Support Integration (LSI) lPT. The MTTF, MTTR, and
other related information garnered from the Reliability
and Maintainability Analyses feed the Supportability
Analysis Process. The Supportability Analyses will
provide for the dynamic flow of interactions between the
flight hardware, ground support equipment, processing
personnel, and facilities.
The Upper Stage PRA, in conjunction with the FS and
USE PRAs, will be integrated by the S&MA Vehicle
Integration Team. The Vehicle Integration (VI) PRA
team performs a top-down analysis which includes
analyses of ascent risk scenarios, abort modeling, and a
thorough review of relevant historical failures. The VI
PRA team then relays this information to the element
Reliability Analysis/PRA teams and the models and
analyses will incorporate this data and feed up to the VI
team. The subsequent PRA models will then merge into
an integrated PRA model for the Ares I launch vehicle.
This analysis, combined with the PRA analysis of the
Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV), integrate to
form an integrated Crew Launch Vehicle (CLV) stack
PRA. A flowchart of the CLV Integrated PRA approach
is shown in Fig. 3.1.
Figure 3.1 Integrated CLV PRA Approach
4.1 Cballenge I: Being tbe Prime
4. CHALLENGES AND
OPPORTUNITIES
By taking the lead in the design of the Upper Stage for
Ares I, NASA is providing a unique opportunity to its
design team and to the Safety and Reliability engineers
within S&MA. The Upper Stage Project has partnered
with S&MA to integrate both qualitative and quantitative
reliability and risk assessment with the subsystem lPTs
responsible for Upper Stage design through concurrent
engineering. This approach has already produced
demonstrated benefits by influencing the design for
improved reliability for several subsystems. In addition,
it offers potential long-term benefits to NASA because
future project managers will be selected from today's
engineers who are getting the hands-on design
experience necessary to successfully manage the
development of future space exploration systems.
Not since the Apollo Program in the 1960's has NASA
been so influential in the design of a space transportation
system. The Space Shuttle and other attempts at next
generation space transportation (Space Launch Initiative
(SLl), Orbital Space Plane (aSp), etc.) relied on an open
trade space and the Request For Proposal (RFP) process.
The FS and the USE have Prime contractors, which make
sense in this context due to the continuity of the
contractors with the Shuttle/Saturn derived hardware.
The Upper Stage however, is unique in the sense that
NASA is functioning as the 'Prime' contractor.
Supportability Analysis Process2.2.3
In-house design presents challenges as well as
opportunities. The learning curve is very steep for the
Upper Stage designers and systems engineers.
Management needs to take this into consideration or else
the projected budget and workforce have the potential of
being underestimated.
4.2 Challenge II: Tight Schedule
On May 25, 1961, President Kennedy announced:
"I believe that this nation should commit itself to
achieving the goal, before this decade is out, of landing a
man on the Moon and returning him safely to the Earth.
No single space project in this period will be more
impressive to mankind, or more important in the long-
range exploration of space; and none will be so difficult
or expensive to accomplish... "[3]
The first manned launch occurred in December 1968,
carrying the Apollo 8 circumlunar mission.
Similarly, on January 14th, 2004 President Bush
announced the "Vision for Space Exploration" with one
of the goals being to develop and fly the Crew
Exploration Vehicle (CEV) by 2012, but no later than
2014.
If the goal of 2012 is to be achieved, this would be
comparable to the schedule of the development of the
Saturn V. The evidence has shown that NASA has
successfully overcome this schedule challenge in the
... past. We therefore have the confidence in overcoming
this challenge today.
4.3 Challenge III: Communication,
Coordination, and Integration
A third challenge is maintaining adequate
communication and coordination within the IPTs and
among the several layers of the Constellation
organizational infrastructure. An approximate
breakdown of the current NASA structure in supporting
the Vision for Space Exploration in relation to the Upper
Stage Organization is as follows:
• Level 0
- Vision for Space Exploration
• Levell
- Exploration Systems Mission Directorate
• Level 2
- Constellation Program
• Level 3
- Ares I, Orion, etc.
• Level 4
- Upper Stage, First Stage, etc.
• Level 5
- MPS, RCS, etc.
The challenge from an Upper Stage viewpoint is to
integrate the level 5 system PRAs into an overall
integrated Upper Stage PRA, while attempting to
maintain consistency with the higher level Ares 1
integrated PRA at Level 3. Assuring consistency ofPRA
methodology within the Upper Stage will not be a
driving issue because it is being developed in house with
a single team of analysts. However, NASA learned from
its development of the Space Shuttle PRA that it can be
challenging to ensure consistent methodology across
multiple contractors. This is particularly true regarding
the data analysis used in quantification of basic events,
such as combining prior data sources, discounting
failures, assessing the applicability of failures, and the
consistent failure-rate analysis of similar components
across subsystems. Since the PRA will be used by the Cx
Program to support risk-informed decision making and to
allocate resources for risk mitigation across the program,
it is imperative that risk be comparable.
5. CONCLUSION
Designing the Ares 1 Upper Stage for reliability and
safety while minimizing weight and maximizing
performance is indeed challenging. The reliability/ risk
analysis process described in this paper has been adopted
and employed in all aspects of the preliminary design
phase to improve the reliability of the CLV and reduce
the risk of loss of mission and loss of crew. This process
will iterate and evolve throughout the program's life
cycle from design, development, testing and operation of
the CLV. The process has already proven valuable in
identifying preliminary design weaknesses that resulted
in design improvements and higher reliability.
6. ACRONYMS
CEV
CLV
FMEA
FS
HA
HEI
IPT
LH2
LOC
LOM
LOX
LSI
MTTF
MTTR
MSFC
NASA
OSP
PBAN
PRA
RA
RCS
RoCS
RFP
RMS
RSRM
SLI
S&MA
TVC
US
USE
VI
Crew Exploration Vehicle
Crew Launch Vehicle
Failure Modes and Effects Analyses
First Stage
Hazard Analysis
Hernandez Engineering Incorporated
Integrated Product Team
Liquid Hydrogen
Loss of Crew
Loss ofMission
Liquid Oxygen
Logistics Support Integration
Mean T4ne To Failure
Mean Time To Repair
Marshall Space Flight Center
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Orbital Space Plane
PolyButadiene AcryloNitrile
Probabilistic Risk Assessment
Reliability Analysis
Reaction Control System
Roll Control System
Request For Proposal
Reliability Maintainability and Supportability
Reusable Solid Rocket Motor
Space Launch Initiative
Safety and Mission Assurance
Thrust Vector Control
Upper Stage
Upper Stage Engine
Vehicle Integration
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